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Abstract
Efficient resource allocation is challenging when privacy of users is important. Dis-
tributed solution approaches have recently been used extensively to find a solution for
such problems. In this work, we study the efficiency of distributed AIMD algorithm
for allocation of subsidized goods. To this end, we assign each user a suitable utility
function describing the amount of satisfaction that it has from allocated resource. We
define the resource allocation as a total utilitarianism problem that is an optimization
problem of sum of users utility functions subjected to capacity constraint. Recently, a
stochastic state-dependent variant of AIMD algorithm is used for allocation of common
goods among users with strictly increasing and concave utility functions. We improve
this algorithm to allocate subsidized goods to users with concave and nonmonotonous
utility functions as well as users with quasi-concave utility functions. We also deran-
domize the AIMD algorithm and compare its efficiency with the stochastic version.
We then model resource allocation problem as a competition game to evaluate the ef-
ficiency properties of unique equilibrium when resource allocation parameters change.
To illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed solutions, we present simulation results
for a public renewable-energy powered charging station in which the electric vehicles
(EV) compete to be recharged.
Keywords– Distributed Resource Allocation, Total Utilitarianism, AIMD Algorithm, Game
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Notation
In this section, we summarize the notations that we use throughout the work. The notations
are either standard or defined on related sections. Generally, we denote scalars and abstract
objects with lowercase or uppercase letters (e.g., n or Γ), vectors by boldface letters (e.g., x)
and sets by uppercase letters (e.g., N ). Each user i’s value is denoted by subscript letters
(e.g., xi) and each iteration t is located inside parenthesis (e.g., xi(t)).
Symbol meaning
R the set of real numbers
R+ the set of non-negative real numbers
N the set of users
i each user’s indicator
n number of users
C capacity constraint
xi user i’s possible value of allocated resource
x∗i user i’s optimal allocated resource
ui strictly increasing, concave, continuously differentiable utility function
vi concave, continuously differentiable utility function
wi strictly increasing, quasi-concave, continuously differentiable utility function
t time steps (iterations)
T last time steps (iterations)
s(t) capacity constraint signal
xi(t) user i’s possible value of allocated resource in iteration (t)
α growth factor
β drop factor
λi the probability for each user i that depends on the long-term average allocated
resource
Γ the parameter that is chosen to ensure that 0 < λi(x¯i) < 1
ηi the slope of logarithmic as well as Sigmoidal utility functions
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χi in kWh is the amount of allocated resource (EV charging) that gives 100 unit
utility to the user i




N a set of players (users)
Xi non-empty set of available actions for player (user) i
x a profile of actions
xnei user i’s Nash equilibrium allocated resource
log the natural logarithm
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Introduction
In many real-world applications, the goal is allocating limited resources among users in
order to achieve maximum total utilization or total utilitarianism. It normally leads to solve
an optimization problem that the objective function is the sum of users utility functions









xi ≤ C ,
xi ≥ 0 , i = 1, . . . , n .
(1)
The notion of utility function indicates how much each user benefits from the amount of
resource that he or she is allocated. To solve this optimization problem, there are two main
solution approaches of centralized and distributed. Centralized solutions are more efficient
since users first admit their individual utility functions to a decision maker, which then solves
the optimization problem of finding the optimal allocated resources. However, users utility
functions are private information and the drawback is that users’ privacy protections will be
challenged.
Distributed allocation is a key concept to resolve this conundrum, i.e., to allocate resources
efficiently while preserving privacy. In distributed resource allocation, a set of users must
autonomously assign their resources with respect to certain criteria and the main goal is
to reach the global optimum. So, the solution to the resource allocation problem does not
require any communication of the private utility functions.
Example 1. Imagine a charging station of Electric Vehicles (EVs) whose power supplies
from renewable energy (e.g., solar, wind). Recent studies reveal that a fuel-driven vehicle can
produce less greenhouse gas emissions than an EV if the recharging energy is entirely pro-
duced by coal-fired power plants. Therefore, local stations for charging EVs from renewable
energy significantly contributes to achieve real environmental benefits [32]. Intuitively these
stations have limited available resources and demand for these finite amounts is increasing.
The users are EV owners who connect their vehicles to the charging station. A private utility
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function determines the level of satisfaction for each EV owner whose EV is connected to
the station to be charged. As the demand for the resource overwhelms the capacity, every
individual who consumes an additional unit directly harms others who can no longer enjoy
the benefits. Since the return of EVs to charging station is non-deterministic, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that EV owners are greedy and prefer to charge their own EVs regardless
of others due to avoid range anxiety. We use logarithmic and Sigmoidal utility functions
to represent the users’ greediness. The logarithmic utility function is chosen because it is
increasing and concave and therefore the total utility, that is sum of concave functions,
mathematically has a global optimal solution. When the goal is considering the amount of
resource that an EV needs for reaching to a predetermined destination, Step function is the
ideal utility function. We, therefore, use the continuous Sigmoidal utility function in order
to approximate this discontinuous Step function. Sigmoidal utility function is a increasing
function with an inflection point that is convex for allocated resource below the inflection
point and is concave for allocated resource above the inflection point.
In this work, we propose an extremely computationally efficient and private solution of the
resource allocation problems. The solution is applicable for common goods such as clean air
and access to public road and land where users do not pay a fee per use, and for subsidized
goods where the fee per use is shared with the entire population. Note that subsidized goods
generalize common goods, which as fully subsidized. The solution approach is distributed and
iterative: each user requests an amount of resource that evolves over time steps according
to its private utility function and whether the total demand exceed the available capacity.
For the case of common goods, in [31] a stochastic and state-dependent variant of AIMD
algorithm is used and it is shown that each user’s requested resource converges quickly to the
optimal allocation. Here, we also show that the derandomized version of such algorithm is
efficient . As a concrete example of resource allocation problem that we will follow throughout
of this work, we present simulation results for a public renewable-energy powered charging
station network in which the electric vehicles (EV) compete to be recharged.
Distributed solution approach for solving the resource allocation problem has some other
advantages in comparison to the centralized approach. First, there is no communication
among users and therefore it significantly reduces the communication overhead. Second, the
distributed approach by decentralizing decisions, is more robust than centralized approach
since there is no single point of failure or hack. Third, the efficiency of the network is not
dependent to number of users.
When users with private utility functions, greedily try to maximize their own utilities, game
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theory is appropriate to study interactions among them and their selfish behavior. The joint
utilisation of a commonly owned resource, when the scarce resource of interest is easily avail-
able to all users, often causes the resource to be overused [10]. This concept, which in game
theoretic approach named the tragedy of the commons, was popularized by Hardin (1968) in
his seminal article [12]. In fact, individuals acting independently and rationally according to
each user’s self-interest behave contrary to the best interests of the whole group by depleting
some common resource. Additionally, an exciting open problem is to improve the proposed
approach to make it incentive compatible, thereby ensuring that each user will represent its
utility function truthfully. Indeed, by misrepresenting their utility functions strategically,
participants can receive a higher allocation, but hurt the utilitarian efficiency of the system
as a whole.
Our Contributions
To address this problem, we study the class of distributed resource allocation and we make
these following specific contributions:
• We propose AIMD algorithm to allocate subsidized goods to users with concave and
nonmonotonous utility functions.
• We propose a derandomized version of AIMD algorithm to allocate common goods to
users with strictly increasing, concave utility functions.
• We extend the results to propose a variant of AIMD algorithm to allocate common
goods to users with quasi-concave utility functions.
• We then prove that our result of AIMD resource allocation of common goods where
users utility functions are strictly increasing, concave is close to the stable result of
Nash equilibrium in game theoretic approach.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. In Section , the problem is modeled as a utility-
based resource allocation problem for both centralized and distributed solution approaches.
We then represent different variants of AIMD resource allocation Algorithm among users
with concave and nonmonotonous as well as Quasi-concave utility functions. This section
ends by presenting the simulation results for the algorithms that are applied in . In Section
, competition on scarce common resource is analyzed by solving resource allocation problem
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in game theoretic approach, and the numerical results is also presented. Finally, conclusions
are summarized in section .
Distributed Resource Allocation
In this section, we formally define resource allocation problem using utility function concept
for both centralized and distributed solution approaches. We then propose variants of AIMD
distributed algorithm for allocation of subsidized (and common) goods between users based
on their specific utility functions. The objective is to determine each user’s optimal allocated
resource at which maximum total utility is achieved. We also include numerical simulations
of total utilitarianism for EV owners who connected their vehicles to a solar-powered charging
station to be charged in order to validate the convergence of our solutions.
Remark 1. In real life applications, the resource could be time-slot like energy in kWh or
time-varying like power in kW. Although, we defined the optimization problem to be solved
in each time-slot, we can use the proposed solution for any time-varying situations without
changing the results.
Baseline, Problem Formulation and Objective
Consider n users utilize a limited shared resource C > 0, and suppose xi ≥ 0 represents
the possible amount of resource consumed by each user i = 1, . . . , n. We attribute a utility,
i.e., a measure of satisfaction, to each user i who takes advantage of the common resource
and describe it by means of a utility function. The utility function ui : R+ → R+, assigns
a non-negative real number to each possible value of allocated resource xi, to represent the
level of satisfaction for each user i or quality of service (QoS).
Figure 1a represents a class of centralized resource allocation problems in which a central de-
cision maker calculates the optimal solution x∗1, ..., x
∗
n, by collecting all information regarding
each user’s utility function ui, capacity constraint C, and number of users n. Therefore, cen-
tralized resource allocation problem can be expressed as nonlinear continuous optimization
problem (1). Although centralized solution approaches focus to determine efficient resource
allocation, in many realistic applications, it is neither applicable nor desirable [22] since it












u1 x1(t), . . .
t→∞−−−→ x∗1
...
ui xi(t), . . .
t→∞−−−→ x∗i
...
un xn(t), . . .
t→∞−−−→ x∗n
⊕∑n
i=1 xi(t) > CMs(t− 1)
(b)
Figure 1: Resource allocation solution approaches, (a) centralized , (b) distributed iterative.
resource allocation problems in which allocations emerge as the result of an iterative of local
procedures. In other words, a set of users locally make decisions regarding their resources
autonomously. To this end, an algorithm is used to assign each user i an allocated resource
xi(t) in time steps (iterations) 1, . . . , t. In each iteration, each user’s algorithm update
user’s allocated resource xi(t) locally by choosing one of these options: increase, decrease or
no-change compared with previous iteration xi(t− 1). The increase option continues until
receiving one bit signal s(t− 1), that notify capacity constraint ∑ni=1 xi(t) > C is violated
and algorithm, based on a certain probability, choose one of the following options : decrease
or no-change. When the capacity is available again
∑n
i=1 xi(t) ≤ C , the increase option of
the algorithm restarts immediately. The procedure repeats until the number of iterations is
large enough t, and users’ allocated resource converge to the optimal allocation x∗1, ..., x
∗
n.
In order to quantify efficiency of distributed resource allocation, inspired from the notion of
Price of Anarchy in game theory, we express the efficiency as the ratio between the output











For the sake of retaining simplicity, we first focus on modeling resource allocation of common
goods, where users do not pay for their allocated resources. We also consider some further and
substantial assumptions, briefly called concavity assumption, for users utility functions which
provide mathematical tractability of optimization problem (1) however limit its applicability.
Assumption 1. (Concavity Assumption) The utility functions ui : R+ → R+, (i) are strictly
increasing functions of xi with ui(0) = 0, (ii) are concave and continuously diffrentiable with
domain xi ≥ 0. Where xi is the amount of resources allocated to user i.
The optimization problem (1) under concavity Assumption 1 for users utility functions, is a
convex optimization problem. The objective function, which is the sum of concave functions,
is therefore concave and each constraint defines a convex set. Consequently, for a convex
optimization problem, there exists a unique tractable global optimal solution [4].
Example 2. In the case of charging EVs, we use normalized logarithmic function as strictly
increasing concave utility function that satisfies concavity Assumption 1 in order to model
the level of satisfaction of EV owners whose car is connected to the charging station to be
charged. Logarithmic utility function ui means that each EV owner’s satisfaction continu-
ously increases when the amount of charging or receiving the resources xi increase. Therefore,





where χi in kWh is the amount of allocated resource (EV charging) that gives 100 unit
utility to the user i. Moreover, in the lack of resource the utility function value is zero. So,
normalized logarithmic utility function satisfies ui(0) = 0 and ui(χi) = 100. The parameter
ηi indicates how the charge needed urgently by effecting on the rate of utility percentage that
is a function of allocated resource xi. Intuitively higher values of ηi yield higher utility to user
i. Figure 2 represents two normalized logarithmic utility functions ui with ηi = 0.11 , χi = 60
and ηi = 24.9 , χi = 100.
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2 i =0.03 , @ i =60
2 i =24.9 , @ i =99
2 i =0.15 , A i =45
3 i =48
Figure 2: Utility functions: normalized logarithmic (strictly-increasing concave) utility func-
tions ui, compared with corresponding nonmonotonous payoff functions vi when L = 0.3
as well as discontinuous Step utility function fi and an approximate continuous Sigmoidal
(quasi-concave) utility function wi .
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2i=1.24 , @ i=63
2i=24.9 , @ i=100
Figure 3: Two normalized logarithmic (strictly-increasing concave) utility functions ui , with
different values of ηi and χi .
Remark 2. AIMD (Additive Increase Multiplicative Decrease) is a distributed and iterative
algorithm that is used widely to control congestion in computer networks. The objective of
AIMD is to determine the share of the resource for each user while total demands remains less
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than the available capacity, and where the limited communication in the network is desired
as well as privacy protection is considered. The AIMD algorithm, in its basic version, is
composed of two procedures. In the additive increase (AI) phase, users continuously request
for more available resource of the network until receiving a notification that the aggregate
amount of available resource has been exceeded. Then the multiplicative decrease (MD)
phase occurs and users respond to the notification by reducing their share proportionally.
The AI phase of the algorithm restarts again immediately and this pattern is repeated by
each active user in the network [7].
Herein, we use a stochastic allocated-dependent version of AIMD Algorithm to solve opti-
mization problem (1). We shall not describe the theorems and proofs of the algorithm here,
rather we refer the interested readers to [31] for details. In AI phase, each active user i
continue to update its allocated resource xi(t) upward by adding an amount of growth fac-
tor α ∈ (0, C) to its previous allocated resource xi(t− 1) while
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ C. When the
capacity limit has been violated, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 xi > C, users are notified to execute MD phase.
Each user will respond to the capacity signal independently with a certain probability λi ,
by multiplying the previous allocated resource xi(t− 1) to a drop factor β ∈ (0, 1) to form
current allocated resource xi(t).
The probability λi at t-th iteration, for each user i, depends on the long-term average al-
located resource x¯i(t) through the relation λi(x¯i(t)) = Γ
u′i(x¯i(t))
x¯i(t)
, where the parameter Γ is
chosen to ensure that 0 < λi(x¯i) < 1. Therefore, the AIMD stochastic allocated-dependent
algorithm used to solve the resource allocation problem (1) is showed as follows.
Algorithm 1 AIMD [31] for user i
1: Initialize xi(0) arbitrary
2: Broadcast the parameter Γ
3: for time steps t = 1, 2, 3, . . . do
4: if
∑n
j=1 xj(t) < C then
5: xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + α;
6: else
7: xi(t+ 1) = βxi(t) with probability λi(x¯i(t)) = Γ
v′i(x¯i(t))
x¯i(t)
8: xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) otherwise;
9: end if
10: end for
Note that the parameter Γ depends on the worst utility function that is independent of
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number of users. It must be communicated to all users prior to the algorithms use by a
central authority [7].
Derandomized Distributed Resource Allocation
In section , we introduced a stochastic version of AIMD algorithm for an efficient allocation
of common goods between users. The probabilistic method can also yield insight into how to
construct deterministic algorithms [23]. We now propose a variant of deterministic AIMD
for the same purpose. We show that the strong convergence of derivative of utility function
of long-term average allocated resource u′i(x¯i(t)), can be used to allocate resource optimally.
So, we define λi(x¯i(t)) = Γ
u′i(x¯i(t))
x¯i(t)
and we use it in MD phase of the algorithm by xi(t+ 1) =
β(1− λi)xi(t) + λixi(t) to build DAIMD Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 DAIMD for user i
1: Initialize xi(0) arbitrary
2: Broadcast the parameter Γ
3: for time steps t = 1, 2, 3, . . . do
4: if
∑n
j=1 xj(t) < C then
5: xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + α;
6: else







We extend resource allocation problem to subsidized goods where the fee per use is shared
with the entire population. Suppose if each user i is charged a constant price L per unit
of the received resources xi. Each user payoff function, vi : R+ → R+ is defined as utility
function minus the cost of received resource as follows:
vi(xi) = ui(xi)− Lxi . (4)
Recall each user utility function ui(xi) is considered under concavity Assumption 1, therefore,
each user payoff function (4) is a concave function but it is not necessarily increasing. The
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initialize xi(0) arbitrary
broadcast the parameter Γ
t = 1; for time steps t = 1, 2, . . . , T ; t = t+ 1
∑n
j=1 xj(t) < C ?
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + α






Figure 4: Distributed and derandomized algorithm to efficient and private allocation of
subsidized goods to each user i, with concave and nonmonotonous utility function. The
parameter λi at t-th iteration, for each user i, depends on the long-term average allocated
resource x¯i(t) through the relation λi(x¯i(t)) = Γ
u′i(x¯i(t))
x¯i(t)
, and the parameter Γ is chosen to
ensure that 0 < λi(x¯i) < 1. The parameters 0 < α < C and 0 < β < 1 are growth factor
and drop factors repectively [31].









xi ≤ C ,
xi ≥ 0 , i = 1, . . . , n .
(5)
The optimization problem 5 in which the objective function is non-negative sum of concave
functions, is concave and there exist a global optimal solution [4].
Example 3. In the case of charging EVs, we use normalized logarithmic function Equa-
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− Lxi . (6)
Figure 2 represents normalized logarithmic utility functions ui with ηi = 24.9 , χi = 99
compared with corresponding payoff functions vi when L = 0.3.
Allocated Resource, xi


























2 i=1.24 , @i=63
2 i=24.9 , @i=100
2 i=1.24 , @i=63 , L=0.3
2 i=24.9 , @i=100 , L=0.3
Figure 5: Two normalized logarithmic (strictly-increasing concave) utility functions ui (solid
lines), compared with corresponding non-increasing payoff functions vi(xi) = ui(xi) − Lxi
(dashed lines) when L = 0.3, with different values of ηi and χi .
The AIMD algorithm is invented for rate control and in our model it tries to continue allocat-
ing whole resource to users without considering maximum users’ utility. We, Therefore, con-
clude that the AIMD Algorithm 1 has no efficient solution among users with non-increasing
utility functions. In other words, from a specific point the allocation of resources not only
do not increase the utility but also decrease it.
We improve AIMD Algorithm 1 by controlling the allocation do not exceed from maximum
payoff of each user and design the PAIMD Algorithm 3. The control is applied locally since
each user i calculates the optimal point x∗i = arg max
xi∈R+
vi(xi), ∀i = 1, . . . , n and then in each
iteration, in the (AI) phase of the algorithm compare it toallocated resource xi(t) + α to
choose the minimum allocation.
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Algorithm 3 PAIMD for user i
1: Initialize xi(0) arbitrary
2: Each user i calculates x∗i = arg max
xi∈R+
vi(xi), ∀i = 1, . . . , n
3: Broadcast the parameter Γ
4: for time steps t = 1, 2, 3, . . . do
5: if
∑n
j=1 xj(t) < C then
6: xi(t+ 1) = min(x
∗
i , xi(t) + α)
7: else
8: xi(t+ 1) = βxi(t) with probability λi(x¯i(t)) = Γ
v′i(x¯i(t))
x¯i(t)




In this section, we try to go beyond convex optimization problems, by eliminating concavity
from Assumption 1. Therefore, we model resource allocation problem of users with quasi-
concave utility functions by choosing versatile Sigmoidal functions. The intuition behind
this utility shape is that low values of allocated resource offer very low increase in degree
of satisfaction to the user. As the allocated resource continues, user satisfaction increases
rapidly until a point where saturation appears and remains sharp after it. User satisfaction
again increase slowly when allocated resource continues toward far away saturation point.
So, the Sigmoidal function is defined as following:
Definition 1. The utility function of wi : R+ → R+ is defined to be Sigmoidal if: (i) The
wi(0) = 0 and ui is strictly increasing function of xi. (ii) wi(xi) is continuously differentiable,
with domain xi ≥ 0. (iii) wi(xi) is convex for xi ≤ ψi and is concave for xi ≥ ψi, which
ψi ∈ R+ is the inflection point.
Example 4. (Why do we need Sigmoidal utility functions?). In some situations, such as
charging an electric vehicle with the goal of reaching a predetermined destination (e.g.,
airport, home, etc.), the user receive negligible (or non) utility until a threshold of resource
is reached (e.g., enough electric charge to arrive at the destination). Ideally, in this situations
the best description of the utility function is through a discontinuous Step function as follows:
fi(xi) =
0 if xi < θi ;100 if xi ≥ θi , (7)
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Allocated Resource, xi


























































2 i =0.25 , A i =40
2 i =0.09 , A i =40
2 i =0.25 , A i =55
(b)
Figure 6: (a) A discontinuous Step utility function fi and an approximate continuous Sig-
moidal utility function wi , (b) Three Sigmoidal (Quasi-concave) utility fictions wi(xi) with
different values of ηi and ψi .
where θi shows the sufficient allocated resource that gives 100 unit utility to user i.
Continious Sigmoidal utility functions may be used to approximate a step utility function to
any arbitrary accuracy [30]. Likewise, the user receives negligible additional utility, once a
threshold of resource is reached. We now model EV owner satisfaction with Sigmoidal utility







where ηi is the steepness of the curve that indicates how the charge is needed urgently for
each user i. The parameter ψi in kWh is the inflection point of the function that achieving
it satisfies the urgent need of user i to resource. The function satisfies wi(0) = 0 and
limxi→∞wi(xi) = 100.
Figure 2 represents a Step utility function fi with θi = 48 and an approximate corresponding
Sigmoidal utility function wi with ηi = 0.15 and ψi = 45.
The QAIMD Algorithm 4 represents the procedure of efficient allocation among users with
sigmoidal utility functions. The key point is that in each iteration (t), the long-term of
allocated resource x¯i(t) is compared with each user i inflection point ψi. If x¯i(t) < ψi, the




construct current state xi(t+1) with a probability λi(x¯i(t)) = Γ1
w′i(x¯i(t))
x¯i(t)
. The decrease phase
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also is made by subtracting α from the previous state. When x¯i(t) ≥ ψi, the algorithm is
work with AIMD Algorithm 1 procedure. Note that there are two parameters Γ1, Γ2 to
ensure 0 < λi(x¯i) < 1 in each case.
Algorithm 4 QAIMD for user i
1: Initialize xi(0) arbitrary
2: Broadcast the parameters Γ1, Γ2
3: for time steps t = 1, 2, 3, . . . do
4: if x¯i(t) < ψi then
5: if
∑n
j=1 xj(t) < C then
6: xi(t+ 1) =
1
β
xi(t) with probability λi(x¯i(t)) = Γ1
w′i(x¯i(t))
x¯i(t)
7: xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) otherwise;
8: else
9: xi(t+ 1) = max(0 , xi(t)− α)
10: end if
11: else







broadcast the parameter Γ1, Γ2
t = 1; for time steps t = 1, 2, . . . , T ; t = t+ 1
x¯i(t) < ψi?
∑n
j=1 xj(t) < C ?
∑n
j=1 xj(t) < C ?
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + α




(1− λi)xi(t) + λixi(t)










Figure 7: Distributed and derandomized algorithm to efficient and private allocation of
common goods to each user i, with quasi-concave utility function. The parameter λi at
t-th iteration, for each user i, depends on the long-term average allocated resource x¯i(t)
through the relation λi(x¯i(t)) = Γ
u′i(x¯i(t))
x¯i(t)
, and the parameter Γ is chosen to ensure that




In order to figure out the effectiveness of variants of AIMD Algorithm, we simulate them in
different cases of charging electric vehicles (EVs). We then calculate the efficiency of each
algorithm by comparing the results with an optimal centralized solution, in MATLAB.
Unless otherwise specified, the general setting of simulation is as follows. The resource
allocation domain is considered as a charging station whose power supplies from renewable
energy (e.g. solar or wind), with constant capacity of C in kWh. We adjust the capacity to
be %65 of the sum of users utility functions when each user receives 100 unit satisfaction.
The users n = 50 are the EV owners who connected their vehicles to the station for charging
at the same time. Each EV owner i comprise its own utility function of ui that corresponds
the amount of charge xi which its vehicle receives. We define the utility ui, of a greedy EV
owner i, to be increasing to the charging status xi in kWh at which his EV is charged. In
other words the EV owner’s satisfaction is increasing to the extent that their EV is charged.
Therefore, we use both logarithmic and Sigmoidal utility functions.
We also set the parameters α = 1 and β = 0.85 while executing AIMD algorithm. In
addition, the parameter Γ is chosen to assure us the condition λi(x¯i) ∈ (0, 1) is satisfied.
Concave Utility Functions
To model the problem, we adopt normalized logarithmic utility function Equation (3) as a
strictly increasing concave function which satisfies Concavity Assumption 1. We choose χi
independent uniformly distributed random number with support (40, 60) and ηi independent
uniformly distributed random number with support (0, 1).
We apply deterministic DAIMD Algorithm 2 for allocation of power as a common good
(no charging fee) to EVs who connected to station to be charged. Figure 8a shows a rapid
convergence for derivative of payoff functions u′i(x¯i(t)) when iteration t increases. Figure 8b
depicts the value of long-term average state x¯i(t) for six randomly selected users and shows
each of them converge to a stable value that is x∗i . Figure 8c reveals the coincidence of
deterministic and stochastic versions of derivative of payoff functions u′i(x¯i(t)). Figure 8d
also represents that deterministic and stochastic version of average state x¯i(t) fluctuate
differently but the long-term averages for each user converge to optimal allocation. The
efficiency of deterministic DAIMD Algorithm 2, calculated by Equation (2), in different runs
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are a real number in the range of (0.97, 0.99).
We apply stochastic PAIMD Algorithm 3 for allocation of power as a subsidized good (with
charging fee) to EVs who connected to station to be charged. Therefore, we consider the
price per unit L ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1} per unit of the power xi in the payoff function (6). The
simulation results in Figure 9a reveals a rapid convergence for derivative of payoff functions
v′i(x¯i(t)) when iteration t increases. Figure 9b represents the value of long-term average state
x¯i(t) for six randomly selected users and shows each of them converge to a stable value that
is x∗i . Figure 9c, depicts the efficiency of AIMD Algorithm 1, PAIMD Algorithm 3 that is
calculated by Equation (2). It shows that PAIMD Algorithm 3 has better performance when
L increases compared with AIMD Algorithm 1.
Quasi-Concave Utility Functions
We now model EV owner satisfaction with Sigmoidal utility function that are expressed by
Equation (8). We choose ψi independent uniformly distributed random number with support
(25, 100) and ηi independent uniformly distributed random number with support (0, 25).
Figure 10a depicts the derivative of utility functions w′i(x¯i(t)) for six randomly selected users.
It illustrates that the derivatives approach to zero as t increase but the convergence is slower
than the derivatives of logarithmic utility function v′i(x¯i(t) in Figure 9a . In Figure 10b the
average of allocated resource x¯i(t) for six randomly selected users is displayed. It shows x¯i(t)
approach to a constant number that is optimal allocated resource x∗i .
Figure 10c represents the efficiency of QAIMD 4, calculated by Equation (2), for different
capacity C/Ψ = {0.5, 0.75, . . . , 3}, where Ψ = ∑ni=1 ψi. For each user i the algorithm
decides between increasing allocated resource or decreasing it toward zero. The efficiency of
the algorithm is better for small values of capacity constraint, but it decrease when capacity
is around Ψ. The efficiency improve again when it is large enough.
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Figure 8: DAIMD Algorithm 2, (a) The deterministic derivative of payoff function u′i(x¯i(t))
for six randomly selected users, (b) The deterministic average of allocated resource x¯i(t) to
the optimal point for six randomly selected users, (c) the deterministic derivative of payoff
function u′i(x¯i(t)) for two randomly selected users (solid lines) compared with corresponding
stochastic ones (dashed lines) , (d) The deterministic average of allocated resource x¯i(t) to
the optimal point for two randomly selected users (solid lines) compared with corresponding
stochastic ones (dashed lines).
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Figure 9: (a) The derivative of payoff function v′i(x¯i(t)) for six randomly selected users when
L = 0.3, (b) the average of allocated resource x¯i(t) to the optimal point for six randomly
selected users when L = 0.3, (c) the efficiency of AIMD Algorithm 1 and PAIMD Algorithm 3
for L ∈ {0, 0.1, . . . , 1} calculated by Equation (2).
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Figure 10: (a) The derivative of utility functions w′i(x¯i(t)) for six randomly selected users
when C/Ψ = 1.5, (b) the average of allocated resource x¯i(t) to the optimal point for six
randomly selected users when C/Ψ = 1.5, (c) the efficiency of QAIMD Algorithm 4 calculated
by Equation (2).
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Loss of Efficiency Due to Competition
In this section, we allow the individual users to act strategically as in a game. We consider a
game in strategic form, where all users’ utility functions are common knowledge. The result-
ing competition over a scarce resource is reminiscent of the tragedy of the commons []. An
user may deviate from the AIMD algorithm and strategically request more resource in order
to improve its payoff. Alternatively, an user may follow the AIMD algorithm but mispresent
its utility function. However, we show that, in some situations, the AIMD outcome and the
game’s Nash equilibrium are close to each other.
Resource Allocation as a Strategic Game
Imagine a resource allocation problem in which there are n users, competing to utilize a scarce
fixed common resource of C > 0. Each user i chooses his own consumption of resources xi
from a set of action space Xi = {xi ∈ R | 0 ≤ xi ≤ C}. A profile of actions x = (xi, x−i)
describe a particular combination of actions chosen by all users, where x−i ∈ X−i is a
particular possible of actions for all players who are not i.
Consuming an amount xi ≥ 0 gives user i a benefit equal to ui(xi) when
∑n
j=1 xj ≤ C and
intuitively no other users benefits from i’s choice. When xi increases or other users consume
more resources so that
∑n
j=1 xj > C, the user get nothing ui(xi) = 0 because additional
requested resources are not provided. Then we define the payoff function u˜i(xi, x−i) of a user




j=1 xj ≤ C ;
0 if
∑n
j=1 xj > C .
(9)
Where the utility function ui(xi) is considered to be concave, strictly increasing, and con-
tinuously differentiable ,i.e., follows assumption 1.
The strategic game (N , Xi, u˜i)i∈N , that have infinitely many pure strategies but utility func-
tions are not continuous, is discontinuous infinite strategic games. This problem should be
consider precisely because it may lead to problem of nonexistence of unique Nash equilibrium.
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Nash Equilibrium
To cut to the chase, the key notion to solve the strategic game (N , Xi, u˜i)i∈N , is the Nash
equilibrium, that is an outcome (a decision made by each player) such that no player can
improve his individual payoff through an unilateral move. As stable situations, Nash equi-
librium are often considered to be the expected outcomes from interactions. To solve for a
Nash equilibrium we compute the best-response function correspondence for each player and
then find an action profile for which all best-response functions are satisfied together.
To find a solution for Equation (9), we first write out each player i’s best-response correspon-
dence and we consider that given x−i, player i will want to choose an element in BRi(x−i).
Given x−i ∈ X−i each player i’s best response is the difference between C and
∑n
j 6=i xj . If
user i asks for more, then all users get nothing while if asks for less then he is leaving some
resources unclaimed and therefore




It is easy to see from the best response correspondence that any profile of demands xi ∈ [0, C]
that add up to C will be a Nash equilibrium. Hence, each player i is indifferent between all
of his requests xi ∈ [0, C] and the game is just not blessed with a unique equilibrium and
has an infinite number of equilibria. The obvious problem with multiple equilibria is that
the players may not know which equilibrium will prevail. Hence, it is entirely possible that
a non-equilibrium outcome results because one player plays one equilibrium strategy while
a second player chooses a strategy associated with another equilibrium [5].
It turns out that resource allocation encounters conflict over scare resources that results from
the tension between individual selfish interests and common good. As Hardin stated in his
article [12], “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all,” that here means, social utility of an
uncontrolled use of the common resources that each user have the freedom to make choices, is
worse than if those choices were regulated. This results in the occurrence of the phenomenon
called tragedy of the commons. In fact, individual users acting independently according to
their own self-interest behave contrary to the common good of all users by depleting that
resource through their collective actions.
To solve this problem, we first need to bring back the continuity to the payoff function
Equation (9). Thus, we apply the resource allocation back-off condition
∑n
j=1 xj > C directly
to the payoff function for each user i. We define a concave penalty function τ : R+ → R+
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so that τ(0) = 1 and τ(C) = 0 and multiply it to the payoff function (9). To generalize, we
also consider each unit of resource costs L and we have





− Lxi for all xi, xj ∈ [0,∞) . (11)













j=1 xj and p ∈ N. Intuitively, τ(0) = 1 and τ(C) = 0.
Figure 11 represents some examples of concave penalty functions Equation (12) for p ∈
{1, 2, 4, 8}. Although the larger values of p reduce inefficiency of Nash equilibrium, however
make calculations more complex. In realistic situation of EV charging, this function can be
programmed to the charger and it works when the demand exceeds from capacity C.
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Figure 11: Penalty Function
Since the payoff functions are continuous there is a strong result on existence of the pure
Nash equilibrium that is stated by Theorem 1 [8].
Theorem 1. (Debreu, Glicksberg, Fan) An infinite strategic form game G = (N , Xi, fi)i∈N
such that for each i ∈ G
i) Xi is compact and convex;
ii) fi(xi, x−i) is continuous in x−i;
iii) fi(xi, x−i) is continuous and concave 1 in xi .
1in fact quasi-concavity suffices.
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Then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
Another important question that arises in the analysis of strategic form games is whether
the Nash equilibrium is unique. Theorem 2, provides sufficient conditions for uniqueness of
an equilibrium in games with infinite strategy sets.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1, [25]). Consider a strategic form game G = (N , Xi, fi)i∈N . For
all i ∈ G, assume that the action sets Xi = {xi ∈ Rmi |hi(xi) ≥ 0}, where hi is a concave
function, and there exists some x˜ ∈ Rmi such that hi(x˜i) > 0 . Assume also that the payoff
functions (fi)i∈N are diagonally strictly concave for x ∈ X . Then the game has a unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. Where payoff functions (fi)i∈N are diagonally strictly concave for
x ∈ X, if for every xne, x¯ ∈ X, we have (x¯− xne)>∇f(xne) + (xne − (x¯)>∇f(x¯) > 0 .
The game (N , Xi, v˜i)i∈N has unique Nash equilibrium that is calculated by maximizing user
i’s payoff function v˜i(xi, x−i) and finding the solution to the first order conditions. So, we




= 0 . (13)
We therefore have n such equations, one for each player, and the unique Nash equilibrium
is the strategy profile xne for which all users in the network, the Equation 13 are satisfied
together, so that




i = arg max
xi∈[0,C]
v˜i(xi, x−i), ∀i ∈ N . (14)
When resource allocation problem form as a result of selfish competition among users, the
resulting stable solution may not, in fact, be system optimal [20]. In this circumstance,
we would like to measure inefficincy constituted due to decentralized control. This is very
important to decide whether a decentralized mechanism can be applied, regarding the loss
of efficiency in comparison with the performance that would be obtained with a central
authority. Price of anarchy (PoA) [17], is a concept that quantifies this inefficiency and is
measured as the ratio between the worst equilibrium and the centralized solution. In the
problem considered here, this notion will be slightly different and defined as the efficiency
of the unique Nash equilibrium of the game G = (N , Xi, fi)i∈N and the optimal centralized










where xne is the unique Nash equilibrium given by (14) and x∗ is the solution of (6) .
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Simulation
In this section, we proceed to simulate resource allocation in competition game to inves-
tigate in more details the inefficiency of Nash equilibrium. For this purpose, suppose the
EV charging station settings of the section . Each user’s utility function is considered as
the normalized logarithmic function (3) with uniformly distributed random parameters of
ηi ∈ (0, 25) and χi ∈ (25, 100). We also consider the concave penalty function Equation 12
with p = 1 for executing the simulation. We start to simulate the problem for two play-
ers. Consider the charging station with the limited resource of C = 25 kWh and two EV
owners i ∈ {1, 2} which their EVs are connected to the station for charging. Both players
have normalized logarithmic utility function Equation (3) with parameters η1 = 15, χ1 = 30
and η2 = 38, χ2 = 70 respectively. Figure 12a depicts inefficiency of distributed competi-
tive resource allocation in two-player game ,i.e., best response functions lines intersection,
compared with optimal solution U(x∗1, x
∗
2).
Now consider the same setting for a charging station with n = 50 users. Figure 12b plots




i ), compared with optimal centralized solution∑
i∈N vi(x
∗
i ) for diffrent L = {0, 0.1, . . . , 1}. Figure 13 represents the price of anarchy in
competition against two parameters of price and number of users. The PoA is so sensitive
to number of users in the competition such that increasing number of users negatively affect
on PoA. Moreover, if the selfish behavior of users in competition do not control by pricing,
inefficiency increase and consequently the PoA decrease. Note that the price of anarchy is
independent of the competition topology [26].
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Figure 12: Inefficiency of distributed competitive resource allocation, (a) In two-player game.





i ), (b) In n-player (n = 50) game compared with optimal solution.
Figure 13: Price of Anarchy (PoA)
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Related Work
Both centralized and distributed solution approaches for the generic problem of resource
allocation were studied widely in various fields of expertise and a full review is impossible
































Figure 14: Conceptual diagram of resource allocation area that is studied in this work.
In many recent applications, in data (or communication) networks the area of resource al-
location optimization has received a surge attention. In such networks, each user adopt an
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admissible utility function to quantify its benefit from achieving resource and the problem,
that is called Network Utility Maximization (NUM), defines as a constrained maximization
of some utility functions [24], [13]. Users utility functions are commonly considered to be
concave, continuous and strictly increasing functions modeling elastic networks [16], [27],
which are more mathematically tractable [4], but limits applicability. On the other hand,
many applications require inelastic network models where non-concave utility functions or
discontinious utility functions need to be maximized [9]. Kelly (1997), in his seminal pa-
per [16], proposed an algorithm to achieve proportional fairness of rate allocation in elastic
networks. Inelastic networks that are more challenging, studied in [19], [9], [11] and speci-
ficely Sigmoidal programming algorithm is proposed in [30]. In [1], using utility proportional
fairness policy, both elastic and inelastic utility functions compared. In large-scale net-
works, distributed solutions are particularly attractive where a centralized solution is not
feasible [24].
There is also substantial literature on AIMD, the algorithm proposed by Chiu and Jain
in [6] and applied experimentally by Jacobson in [14], as the most efficient-fair rate control
in Internet applications. The efficiency and fairness of the AIMD algorithm also investigated
in [18] and a comprehensive review of the AIMD algorithm and its applications is collected
in [7]. This work uses the result of [31] that used AIMD algorithm in stochastic framework
for common goods resource allocation.
EV charging has been the most widely studied as an application of distributed resource
allocation. In [2], Ardakanian et al. (2013) proposed a distributed control algorithm that
adapts the charging rate of EVs to the available capacity of the network ensuring that network
resources are used efficiently and each EV charger receives a fair share of these resources.
Inspired by the design of the Internet, which offers best effort services to elastic applications
that back off in case of congestion [19], our approach is to quickly adapt EV charging
rates to the condition of the network [4]. Specifically, we propose a distributed control
algorithm so that every charger can independently set its charging rate based on congestion
signals it receives from measurement nodes installed on its path to the sub-transmission
substation. This algorithm ensures that EV chargers receive a proportionally fair [11] share
of the available capacity of the distribution network, and lines and transformers are not
overloaded. In [3], a static non-cooperative game formulation of the problem of distributed
charging in electrical vehicle (EV) networks is proposed.
In [29], Stuedli et al. (2012) proposed a distributed AIMD based algorithm to allocate avail-
able power among connected EVs in order to maximize the utilization of EV owners in a
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range of situations. In [28], they (2012) also used the same formalization framework to ex-
pand the modifications of the basic AIMD algorithm to charge EVs. In both articles they
considered a fairness policy as a constraint. The effectiveness of AIMD at mitigating the
impact of domestic charging of EVs on low-voltage distribution networks is investigated [21]
by Liu and McLoone (2015).
In [22], Marden and Wierman (2013) introduced a class of games termed distributed wel-
fare games, which represents a game theoretic model for resource allocation problems with
separable objective/welfare functions. It is the closest line of work to ours in game theo-
retic approach, however it is considered a finite strategic-form game where each player has
a finite action set and a discrete utility function. Hardin (1968), in his seminal article [12],
popularized the concept of the tragedy of the commons as an economic theory of a situa-
tion within a shared-resource system where individual users acting independently according
to their own self-interest behave contrary to the common good of all users by depleting or
spoiling that resource through their collective action. In [17], Koutsoupias and Papadim-
itriou (1999) introduced the concept of price of anarchy that is the idea of quantifying the
inefficiency of selfish solutions using the framework of approximation. In network resource
allocation, the notion of price of anarchy is introduced to quantify efficiency loss by Johari
and Tsitsiklis (2004) in [15].
Conclusions & Future Work
In this work, we introduced the problem of resource allocation for subsidized goods among
large number of users. We proposed variants of AIMD distributed algorithm for an efficient
and private allocation. To this end, we first defined resource allocation problems as a class
of NUM problems. We improved AIMD algorithm,both stochastic and deterministic, to
allocate subsidized goods where users have concave and nonmonotonous utility functions.
We extended the results to propose a variant of AIMD algorithm to allocate common resource
where users have quasi-concave utility functions.
We also modeled the same problem as a strategic game in order to figure out the unique
Nash equilibrium. We represented inefficiency of the solution by calculating price of anarchy
that is the result of the tragedy of the commons in a network in which users compete for
scarce resources. We then proved that our result of AIMD resource allocation of common
goods where users utility functions are concave increasing, is better than stable result of
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Resource Allocation Solution Approaches
AIMD Algorithm
Scenario 1
Stictly Inceasing, Concave Utility Functions
Stochastic AIMD Algorithm 1
Deterministic DAIMD Algorithm 2
Scenario 2
Stictly Inceasing, Concave Utility Functions : with Payment
Stochastic PAIMD Algorithm 3
Scenario 3
Stictly Inceasing, Quasi-Concave Utility Functions
Nash Equilibruim
Competition
Users Utility Functions : Stictly Inceasing, Concave
Stochastic QAIMD Algorithm 4
Figure 15: Conceptual diagram of Resource Allocation Solution Approaches: AIMD and
Competition.
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Nash equilibrium in game theoretic approach.
We simulated the results in a different networks of renewable-energy powered charging sta-
tion in which EVs connected to be charged and we showed through simulations that our
algorithms converge to the optimal solution.
Given that distributed resource allocation for inelastic networks using NUM is NP-hard, it
is not surprising that many issues remain open on this challenging topic. However, AIMD
Algorithm efficiency remains unknown when any condition of Assumption 1 is violated, more
precisely either a generic non-concave or a discontinuous utility function is considered.
Another exciting open problem is to improve the proposed approach to make it incentive
compatible, thereby ensuring that each user, e.g., electric vehicle will represent its utility
function truthfully.
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The additive-increase/multiplicative-decrease (AIMD) algorithm is a feedback control algo-
rithm best known for its use in TCP congestion control. AIMD combines linear growth of
the congestion window with an exponential reduction when a congestion takes place. Mul-
tiple flows using AIMD congestion control will eventually converge to use equal amounts of
a contended link [6]. The related schemes of multiplicative-increase/multiplicative-decrease
(MIMD) and additive-increase/additive-decrease (AIAD) do not converge. The approach
taken is to increase the transmission rate (window size), probing for usable bandwidth, until
loss occurs. The policy of additive increase may, for instance, increase the congestion win-
dow by a fixed amount every round trip time. When congestion is detected, the transmitter
decreases the transmission rate by a multiplicative factor; for example, cut the congestion
window in half after loss. The result is a saw-tooth behavior that represents the probe for
bandwidth.
To make AIMD algorithm more tangible, we can compare it with Economic Order Quantity
(EOQ) in inventory management. The EOQ is used as part of a continuous review inventory
system in which the level of inventory is monitored at all times and a fixed quantity is ordered
each time the inventory level reaches a specific reorder point.
AIMD requires a binary signal of congestion. Most frequently, packet loss serves as the
signal; the multiplicative decrease is triggered when a timeout or acknowledgement message
indicates a packet was lost. It is also possible for in-network mechanisms to mark congestion
(without discarding packets) as in Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN).
Let ω(t) be the sending rate (e.g. the congestion window) during time slot t, (a > 0) be the
additive increase parameter, and (0 < b < 1) be the multiplicative decrease factor.
ω(t+1) =
ω(t) + a, if congestion is not detectedω(t) + b, if congestion is detected
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Additive increase/multiplicative decrease
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Figure 16: Saw-tooth AIMD, TCP congestion control
In TCP, after slow start, the additive increase parameter a is typically one MSS (maximum
segment size) per round-trip time, and the multiplicative decrease factor b is typically 1/2.
MATLAB Code
In the following the simulation procedure written in MATLAB code is represented. We
first define concave and quasi-concave utility functions and their derivatives in section . in
section , AIMD for concave and nonmonotonous utility functions and in , AIMD for quasi-
concave utility functions is represented.
Utility Functions
f unc t i on [ u ] = UtilFunc ( x , eta , x max )
zeta =100;
u = 1 ∗ l og ( 1 + eta ∗ x ) / log ( 1 + eta ∗ x max ) ;
end
func t i on [ dU ] = dUtilFunc ( x , eta , x max )
zeta =100;
dU =(zeta ∗ eta ) / ( ( 1 + eta ∗ x ) ∗ l og ( 1 + eta ∗ x max ) ) ;
end
func t i on [ w ] = w( x , etaa , x i n f )
ze ta =100;
w = zeta /(1+exp(−etaa ∗(x−x i n f ) ) ) − ze ta /(1+exp ( etaa ∗ x i n f ) ) ;
end
func t i on [ d w ] = dw( x , etaa , x i n f )
ze ta =100;
d w = zeta ∗ etaa ∗ exp(−etaa ∗(x−x i n f ) ) / (1+exp(−etaa ∗(x−x i n f ) ) ) ˆ2 ;
end
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AIMD for Concave and Nonmonotonous Utility Functions
% S t o c h a s t i c and Det rmin i s t i c AIMD f o r Subs id i zed ( and common) Goods .
% Concave and nonmonotonous u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s
c l c ; c l e a r a l l ;
f o r m=1:1000
% Def ine parameters
alpha =1; beta =0.65; n=50;
f o r i =1:n
x 0 ( i )=rand ; eta ( i )= rand ∗ 25 ; x max ( i )= randi ( [ 2 5 , 1 0 0 ] ) ; x u ( i ) = 0 ;
end
C=0.65∗sum( x max ) ; gamma=50; L Vec = 0 : 0 . 1 : 1 ;
% AIMD Algorithm
f o r l =1:11
L=L Vec ( l ) ; x=x 0 ; sum x= ze ro s (1 , 50 ) ; t =1;
whi l e t<1000
f o r i =1:50
sum x ( i ) = sum x ( i ) + x ( i ) ;
xbar ( i ) =sum x ( i ) /( t +1) ;
du xbar ( i ) =dUtilFunc ( xbar ( i ) , e ta ( i ) , x max ( i ) )−L ;
i f sum( x )<C & x ( i )<x max ( i )
u i b e f o r e ( i )=UtilFunc ( x ( i ) , e ta ( i ) , x max ( i ) )−(L∗x ( i ) ) ;
x ( i )=x ( i )+alpha ;
u i a f t e r ( i )=UtilFunc ( x ( i ) , e ta ( i ) , x max ( i ) )−(L∗x ( i ) ) ;
i f u i b e f o r e ( i ) < u i a f t e r ( i )
x ( i )=x ( i ) ;
e l s e
x ( i )=x ( i )−alpha ;
end
e l s e i f sum( x )<C & x ( i )>=x max ( i )
x ( i )=x ( i ) ;
e l s e
R=rand ;
lambda = gamma∗du xbar ( i ) / xbar ( i ) ;
i f R > lambda
x ( i )=beta ∗x ( i ) ;
e l s e
x ( i )=x ( i ) ;
end
end
mat du xbar ( ( l −1)∗n+i , t )= du xbar ( i ) ;
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f o r i =1:50
u i m o d i f i e d ( i )=UtilFunc ( x ( i ) , eta ( i ) , x max ( i ) )−(L∗x ( i ) ) ;
end
U modif ied ( l )= sum( u i m o d i f i e d ) ;
To ta l A l l o ca t ed x mod i f i ed ( : , l )= sum( x ) ;
end
U mat (m, : )=U;
x s toch=x ;
% Dete rm in i s t i c AIMD Algorithm
f o r l =1:1
L=L Vec ( l ) ; x=x 0 ; sum x= ze ro s (1 , 50 ) ; t=1
whi le t<10000
f o r i =1:50
sum x ( i ) = sum x ( i ) + x ( i ) ;
xbar ( i ) =sum x ( i ) /( t +1) ;
du xbar ( i ) =dUtilFunc ( xbar ( i ) , e ta ( i ) , x max ( i ) )−L ;
i f sum( x )<C & x ( i )<x max ( i )
x ( i )=x ( i )+alpha ;
e l s e i f sum( x )<C & x ( i )>x max ( i )
x ( i )=x ( i ) ;
e l s e
lambda = gamma∗du xbar ( i ) / xbar ( i ) ;
x ( i )=beta∗(1− lambda ) ∗x ( i ) + ( lambda ) ∗x ( i ) ;
i f x ( i )<x 0 ( i )
x ( i )=x 0 ( i ) ;
e l s e
x ( i )=x ( i ) ;
end
end
mat du xbar ( ( l −1)∗n+i , t )= du xbar ( i ) ;




f o r i =1:50
u i d e t e r ( i )=UtilFunc ( x ( i ) , e ta ( i ) , x max ( i ) )−(L∗x ( i ) ) ;
end
U deter ( l )= sum( u i d e t e r ) ;
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T o t a l A l l o c a t e d x d e t e r ( : , l )= sum( x ) ;
end
U mat deter (m, : ) = U deter ;
x de t e r=x ;
% Nonl inear programming s o l v e r ( fmincon )
f o r l =1:11
L=L Vec ( l ) ;
fun = @( x ) −( ( 100∗ l og ( 1 + eta (1 ) ∗ x (1 ) ) / l og ( 1 + eta (1 ) ∗ x max (1) ) )−L
∗x (1 ) + . . .
( 100∗ l og ( 1 + eta (2 ) ∗ x (2 ) ) / l og ( 1 + eta (2 ) ∗ x max (2) ) )−L
∗x (2 ) + . . .
% . . . A l l u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s 3 to 48 .
( 100∗ l og ( 1 + eta (49) ∗ x (49) ) / l og ( 1 + eta (49) ∗ x max (49)
) )− L∗ x (49) + . . .
( 100∗ l og ( 1 + eta (50) ∗ x (50) ) / l og ( 1 + eta (50) ∗ x max (50) )
)− L∗ x (50) ) ;
x0 ( 1 : 5 0 ) = 10 ;
A = ones (1 , 50 ) ;
b = C;
Aeq = [ ] ;
beq = [ ] ;
lb=ze ro s (1 , 50 ) ;
ub ( 1 : 5 0 ) = x max ;
[ x , f v a l ] = fmincon ( fun , x0 ,A, b , Aeq , beq , lb , ub ) ;




Tota l A l l o ca ted x fmincon ( : , l )= sum( x ) ;
end
u fmincon mat (m, : )=u fmincon ;
end
% Plot U t i l i t y Functions ( Concave and nonmonotonous )
h = f i g u r e ;
h1=p lo t ( mat xxx u ( : , 1 ) , mat u ( : , 1 ) ) ; hold on ;
h3=p lo t ( mat xxx u ( : , 2 ) , mat u ( : , 2 ) ) ; hold on ;
h2=p lo t ( mat xxx u l ( : , 1 ) , mat u l ( : , 1 ) , ’−− ’ ) ; hold on ;
h4=p lo t ( mat xxx u l ( : , 2 ) , mat u l ( : , 2 ) , ’−− ’ ) ;
g r i d on ;
x l a b e l ( ’ A l located Resource , $ x i $ ’ , ’ FontSize ’ ,10 , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
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y l a b e l ({ ’ $$\ textnormal {\ hspace {0 .1mm} U t i l i t y Function , $u i $ }$$ ’ , ’ $$\
textnormal {Payof f Function , $ v i $ }$$ ’ } , ’ FontSize ’ ,10 , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’
Latex ’ )
h l egend = legend ( ’ Locat ion ’ , ’ bes t ’ , s t r c a t ( ’ \ e t a i= ’ , num2str ( e ta graph 1 ) ,
’ , \ c h i i= ’ , num2str ( x max graph 1 ) ) , s t r c a t ( ’ \ e t a i= ’ , num2str ( round (
eta graph n , 1) ) , ’ , \ c h i i= ’ , num2str ( x max graph n ) ) , s t r c a t ( ’ \ e t a i=
’ , num2str ( e ta graph 1 ) , ’ , \ c h i i= ’ , num2str ( x max graph 1 ) , ’ , L=0.3 ’
) , s t r c a t ( ’ \ e t a i= ’ , num2str ( round ( eta graph n , 1) ) , ’ , \ c h i i= ’ ,
num2str ( x max graph n ) , ’ , L=0.3 ’ ) )
s e t ( h legend , ’ FontSize ’ , 5 ) ;
s e t (h , ’ Units ’ , ’ Inches ’ ) ;
a x i s ( [ 0 , 100 , 0 , 1 0 5 ] )
s e t (h , ’ PaperPos i t ion ’ , [ 0 0 3 .20 2 . 4 ] ) ; s e t (h , ’ PaperSize ’ , [ 3 . 2 0 2 . 4 ] ) ;
p r i n t (h , ’ uv ’ , ’−dpdf ’ , ’−r0 ’ )
% Plot : the d e r i v a t i v e o f payo f f f unc t i on $v ’ i (\ bar{x} i {( t ) }) $ f o r s i x
% randomly s e l e c t e d us e r s when $L=0.3$ .
h = f i g u r e ; l =4;
f o r i =1:9:50
p l o t ( mat du xbar ( ( l −1)∗n+i , 1 : 5 0 ) )
hold on
end
x l a b e l ( ’ $t$ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
y l a b e l ( ’ $vˆ{\prime} i (\ bar{x} i ( t ) ) $ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
g r id on
s e t (h , ’ Units ’ , ’ Inches ’ ) ; a x i s ( [ 0 , 50 , 0 , 5 0 ] ) ;
s e t (h , ’ PaperPos i t ion ’ , [ 0 0 3 .20 2 . 4 ] ) ; s e t (h , ’ PaperSize ’ , [ 3 . 2 0 2 . 4 ] ) ;
p r i n t (h , ’ upr ime xbar t ’ , ’−dpdf ’ , ’−r0 ’ )
% Plot : the average o f a l l o c a t e d r e sou r c e $\bar{x} i {( t ) }$ to the optimal
% point f o r s i x randomly s e l e c t e d us e r s when $L=0.3$ .
h = f i g u r e ; l =4;
p l o t ( mat xbar ( : , ( l −1)∗n+1) ) ; hold on ;
p l o t ( mat xbar ( : , ( l −1)∗n+10) ) ; hold on ;
p l o t ( mat xbar ( : , ( l −1)∗n+19) ) ; hold on ;
p l o t ( mat xbar ( : , ( l −1)∗n+28) ) ; hold on ;
p l o t ( mat xbar ( : , ( l −1)∗n+37) ) ; hold on ;
p l o t ( mat xbar ( : , ( l −1)∗n+46) ) ; hold o f f
x l a b e l ( ’ I t e r a t i o n s $ ( t ) $ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
y l a b e l ( ’ $\bar{x} i ( t ) $ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
g r id on
s e t (h , ’ Units ’ , ’ Inches ’ ) ; a x i s ( [ 0 , 1000 , 0 , 6 0 ] ) ;
s e t (h , ’ PaperPos i t ion ’ , [ 0 0 3 .20 2 . 4 ] ) ; s e t (h , ’ PaperSize ’ , [ 3 . 2 0 2 . 4 ] ) ;
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pr in t (h , ’ xbar t ’ , ’−dpdf ’ , ’−r0 ’ )
% Plot : the d e t e r m i n i s t i c d e r i v a t i v e o f payo f f f unc t i on
% $u ’ i (\ bar{x} i {( t ) }) $ f o r two randomly s e l e c t e d us e r s ( s o l i d
% l i n e s ) , compared with corre spond ing s t o c h a s t i c ones ( dashed l i n e s .
h = f i g u r e ; l =1;
p l o t ( mat du xbar deter ( ( l −1)∗n+1 ,1:50) ) ; hold on
p lo t ( mat du xbar ( ( l −1)∗n+1 ,1:50) , ’−− ’ , ’ LineWidth ’ , 2) ; hold on
p lo t ( mat du xbar deter ( ( l −1)∗n+20 ,1:50) ) ; hold on
p lo t ( mat du xbar ( ( l −1)∗n+20 ,1:50) , ’−− ’ , ’ LineWidth ’ , 2) ; hold on
x l a b e l ( ’ $t$ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
y l a b e l ( ’ $uˆ{\prime} i (\ bar{x} i ( t ) ) $ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
l egend ( ’DAIMD’ , ’AIMD’ )
g r id on
s e t (h , ’ Units ’ , ’ Inches ’ ) ;
a x i s ( [ 0 , 50 , 0 , 5 0 ] )
s e t (h , ’ PaperPos i t ion ’ , [ 0 0 3 .20 2 . 4 ] ) ; s e t (h , ’ PaperSize ’ , [ 3 . 2 0 2 . 4 ] ) ;
p r i n t (h , ’ Duprime xbar t compare ’ , ’−dpdf ’ , ’−r0 ’ )
% Plot : The d e t e r m i n i s t i c average o f a l l o c a t e d r e sou r c e $\bar{x} i {( t ) }$ to
% the optimal po int f o r two randomly s e l e c t e d us e r s ( s o l i d l i n e s ) compared
% with corre spond ing s t o c h a s t i c ones ( dashed l i n e s ) .
h = f i g u r e ; l =1;
p l o t ( mat xbar deter ( : , ( l −1)∗n+1) ) ; hold on ;
p l o t ( mat xbar ( : , ( l −1)∗n+1) , ’−− ’ , ’ LineWidth ’ , 1) ; hold on
p lo t ( mat xbar deter ( : , ( l −1)∗n+35) ) ; hold on
p lo t ( mat xbar ( : , ( l −1)∗n+35) , ’−− ’ , ’ LineWidth ’ , 1) ; hold o f f
x l a b e l ( ’ I t e r a t i o n s $ ( t ) $ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
y l a b e l ( ’ $\bar{x} i ( t ) $ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
l egend ( ’DAIMD’ , ’AIMD’ )
g r id on
s e t (h , ’ Units ’ , ’ Inches ’ ) ; a x i s ( [ 0 , 5000 , 0 , 8 0 ] )
s e t (h , ’ PaperPos i t ion ’ , [ 0 0 3 .20 2 . 4 ] ) ; s e t (h , ’ PaperSize ’ , [ 3 . 2 0 2 . 4 ] ) ;
p r i n t (h , ’ Dxbar t compare ’ , ’−dpdf ’ , ’−r0 ’ )
% Plot : the e f f i c i e n c y o f s t o c h a s t i c AIMD Algorithm and PAIMD Algorithm f o r
% $L\ in \{0 , 0 . 1 , \dots , 1\}$ .
h = f i g u r e ;
PoA = U mat . / u fmincon mat ;
y3 = mean(PoA) ; e3 = std (PoA) ;
PoA modified = U mat modif ied . / u fmincon mat ;
y4 = mean( PoA modified ) ; e4 = std ( PoA modified ) ;
e r r o rba r ( L Vec , y3 , e3 ) ; hold on
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e r r o rba r ( L Vec , y4 , e4 , ’−− ’ ) ;
g r i d on
x l a b e l ( ’ $L$ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
y l a b e l ( ’ E f f i c i e n c y ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
l egend ({ ’ E l a s t i c AIMD’ , ’ E l a s t i c PAIMD’ } , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ , ’ Locat ion ’ , ’
s outheas t ’ )
s e t (h , ’ Units ’ , ’ Inches ’ ) ;
a x i s ( [ 0 , 1 , 0 . 7 , 1 . 1 ] )
s e t (h , ’ PaperPos i t ion ’ , [ 0 0 3 .20 2 . 4 ] ) ;
s e t (h , ’ PaperSize ’ , [ 3 . 2 0 2 . 4 ] ) ;
p r i n t (h , ’ e f f i c i e n c y ’ , ’−dpdf ’ , ’−r0 ’ )
% Plot : the e f f i c i e n c y o f d e t e r m i n i s t i c AIMD Algorithm and DAIMD Algorithm
% f o r $L\ in \{0 , 0 . 1 , \dots , 1\}$ .
h = f i g u r e ;
PoA deter = U mat deter . / u fmincon mat ;
y4 = mean( PoA deter ) ;
e4 = std ( PoA deter ) ;
e r r o rba r ( L Vec , y4 , e4 ) ;
g r i d on
x l a b e l ( ’ $L$ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
y l a b e l ( ’ E f f i c i e n c y ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
s e t (h , ’ Units ’ , ’ Inches ’ ) ;
a x i s ( [ 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 . 1 ] )
s e t (h , ’ PaperPos i t ion ’ , [ 0 0 3 .20 2 . 4 ] ) ; s e t (h , ’ PaperSize ’ , [ 3 . 2 0 2 . 4 ] ) ;
p r i n t (h , ’ D e f f i c i e n c y ’ , ’−dpdf ’ , ’−r0 ’ )
AIMD for Quasi-Concave Utility Functions
% S t o c h a s t i c AIMD f o r common Goods .
% Quasi−concave u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s
c l c ; c l e a r a l l ;
f o r m=1:1000
% Def ine parameters
i i v e c = 0 . 5 : 0 . 2 5 : 3 ; n=50;
f o r i i =1:11
cc=i i v e c ( i i ) ;
f o r i =1:n
x 0 ( i )=rand ;
etaa ( i )=randi ( [ 1 1 , 5 0 ] ) ∗0 . 0 1 ;
x i n f ( i )=randi ( [ 4 0 , 6 0 ] ) ;
end
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alpha =1; beta =0.85; gamma1=5; gamma2= 10 ; C=sum( x i n f ) ∗ cc ;
sum x= ze ro s (1 , n) ; x=x 0 ; L=0; t =1; t1 =0; t2 =0;
% AIMD Algorithm
whi le t<100000
f o r i =1:n
sum x ( i ) = sum x ( i ) + x ( i ) ;
x bar ( i ) = sum x ( i ) / t ;
du xbar Sigmoid ( i )= dw( x bar ( i ) , etaa ( i ) , x i n f ( i ) ) ;
R = rand ;
i f sum( x )<C
i f x bar ( i )<x i n f ( i )
lambda1 = gamma1∗du xbar Sigmoid ( i ) / x bar ( i ) ;
i f lambda1<R
x ( i )=x ( i ) ∗ 1/ beta ;
e l s e
x ( i )=x ( i ) ;
end
e l s e
x ( i )= x ( i )+ alpha ;
i f x ( i )>1.5∗ x i n f ( i )
x ( i )= x ( i )−alpha ;
e l s e
x ( i )=x ( i ) ;
end
end
e l s e
i f x bar ( i )<x i n f ( i )
x ( i ) = x ( i )−alpha ;
i f x ( i )<0
x ( i )= 0 ;
e l s e
x ( i )= x ( i ) ;
end
e l s e
lambda2 = gamma2∗du xbar Sigmoid ( i ) / x bar ( i ) ;
i f lambda2<R;
x ( i ) = x ( i ) ∗beta ;
e l s e









f o r i =1:n
u i ( i )=w( y ( i ) , etaa ( i ) , x i n f ( i ) ) ;
end
sum u=sum( u i ) ;
sum y=sum( y ) ;
cum u cc ( i i )=sum u ;
end
cum u cc mat (m, : ) = cum u cc ;
x=x 0 ;
f o r i i =1:11
cc=i i v e c ( i i ) ;
C=sum( x i n f ) ∗ cc ;
end
% Nonl inear programming s o l v e r ( fmincon ) ; As in Previous
end
% Plot : the d e r i v a t i v e o f u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s $w ’ i (\ bar{x} i {( t ) }) $ f o r s i x
% randomly s e l e c t e d us e r s when $C / \Psi =1.5$ .
h = f i g u r e ; i i =5;
f o r i =1:9:50
p l o t ( mat du xbar ( ( i i −1)∗n+i , 1 : 6 0 0 ) )
hold on
end
x l a b e l ( ’ $t$ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
y l a b e l ( ’$wˆ{\prime} i (\ bar{x} i ( t ) ) $ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
g r id on
s e t (h , ’ Units ’ , ’ Inches ’ ) ; a x i s ( [ 0 , 600 , 0 , 1 5 ] )
s e t (h , ’ PaperPos i t ion ’ , [ 0 0 3 .20 2 . 4 ] ) ; s e t (h , ’ PaperSize ’ , [ 3 . 2 0 2 . 4 ] ) ;
p r i n t (h , ’ wprime xbar t ’ , ’−dpdf ’ , ’−r0 ’ )
% Plot : the average o f a l l o c a t e d r e sou r c e $\bar{x} i {( t ) }$ to the optimal
% point f o r s i x randomly s e l e c t e d us e r s when $C / \Psi =1.5$ .
h = f i g u r e ; l =4;
p l o t ( mat xbar ( : , ( i i −1)∗n+1) ) ; hold on ;
p l o t ( mat xbar ( : , ( i i −1)∗n+10) ) ; hold on
p lo t ( mat xbar ( : , ( i i −1)∗n+19) ) ; hold on ;
p l o t ( mat xbar ( : , ( i i −1)∗n+28) ) ; hold on ;
p l o t ( mat xbar ( : , ( i i −1)∗n+37) ) ; hold on ;
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p lo t ( mat xbar ( : , ( i i −1)∗n+46) ) ; hold o f f ;
x l a b e l ( ’ I t e r a t i o n s $ ( t ) $ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
y l a b e l ( ’ $\bar{x} i ( t ) $ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
g r id on
s e t (h , ’ Units ’ , ’ Inches ’ ) ; a x i s ( [ 0 , 1000 , 0 , 1 0 0 ] )
s e t (h , ’ PaperPos i t ion ’ , [ 0 0 3 .20 2 . 4 ] ) ; s e t (h , ’ PaperSize ’ , [ 3 . 2 0 2 . 4 ] ) ;
p r i n t (h , ’ wxbar t ’ , ’−dpdf ’ , ’−r0 ’ )
% Plot : the e f f i c i e n c y o f QAIMD Algorithm .
poa= cum u cc mat . / u fmincon mat ;
h = f i g u r e ;
y1 = mean( poa ) ; e1 = std ( poa ) ;
xx=i i v e c ; e r r o rba r ( xx , y1 , e1 ) ;
g r i d on
x l a b e l ( ’$C/\Psi$ ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
y l a b e l ( ’ E f f i c i e n c y ’ , ’ I n t e r p r e t e r ’ , ’ Latex ’ )
s e t (h , ’ Units ’ , ’ Inches ’ ) ; a x i s ( [ 0 . 5 , 3 , 0 . 6 , 1 . 2 ] ) ;
s e t (h , ’ PaperPos i t ion ’ , [ 0 0 3 .20 2 . 4 ] ) ; s e t (h , ’ PaperSize ’ , [ 3 . 2 0 2 . 4 ] ) ;
p r i n t (h , ’ e f f i c i e n c y S ’ , ’−dpdf ’ , ’−r0 ’ ) ;
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